VII

            Many persons regard the opposition of the learned world as constituting, if not a proof, at least a very strong presumption of the falsity of Spiritism. We are not of those who affect indifference in regard to the judgment of scientific men; on the contrary, we hold them in great esteem, and should think it an honour to be of their number, but we cannot consider their opinion as being, under all circumstances, necessarily and absolutely conclusive.

            When the votaries of science go beyond the bare observation of facts, when they attempt to appraise and to explain those facts, they enter tip on the field of conjecture; each advances a system of his own, which he does his utmost to bring into favour, and defends with might and main. Do we not see every day the most divergent systems brought forward and rejected, one after the other; now cried down as absurd errors, and now cried up as incontestable truths? Facts are the sole criterion of reality, the sole argument that admits of no reply: in the absence of facts, the wise man suspends his judgment.

            In regard to all matters that have already been fully examined, the verdict of the learned is justly held to be authoritative, because their knowledge of them is fuller and more enlightened than that of ordinary men; but in regard to new facts or principles, to matters imperfectly known, their opinion can only be hypothetic, because they are no more exempt from prejudice than other people It may even be said that scientific men are more apt to be prejudiced than the rest of the world, because each of them is naturally inclined to look at everything from the special point of view that has been adopted by him; the mathematician admitting no other order of proof than that of an algebraic demonstration, the chemist referring everything to the action of the elements, etc. When a man has made for himself a specialty, he usually devotes his whole mind to it; beyond the scope of this specialty he often reasons falsely, because, owing to the weakness of human reason, he insists on treating every subject in the same way; and therefore, while we should willingly and confidemly consult a chemist in regard to a question of analysis, a physicist in regard to electricity, a mechanician in regard to a motive power, we must be allowed, without in any way derogating from the respect due to their special knowledge, to attach no more weight to their unfavourable opinion of Spiritism than we should do to the judgment of an architect on a question relating to the theory of music.

            The positive sciences are based on the properties of matter, which may be experimented upon and manipulated at pleasure; but spiritist phenomena are an effect of the action of intelligences who have wills of their own, and who constantly show us that they are not subjected to ours. The observation of facts, therefore, cannot be carried on in the latter case in the same way as in the former one, for they proceed from another source, and require special conditions; and, consequently, to insist upon submitting them to the same methods of investigation is to insist on assuming the existence of analogies that do not exist. Science, properly so called, is therefore incompetent, as such, to decide the question of the truth of Spiritism; it has nothing to do with it; and its verdict in regard to it, whether favourable or otherwise, is of no weight. Spiritist belief is the result of a personal conviction that scientific men may hold as individuals, and independent of their quality as scientists; but to submit the question to the decision of physical science would be much the same thing as to set a company of physicists and astronomers to decide the question of immortality. Spiritism deals exclusively with the existence of the soul, and its state after death; and it is stipremely un-reasonable to assume that a man must be a great psychologist simply because he is a great mathematician or a great anatomist. The anatomist, when dissecting a human body, looks for the soul, and, as he does not find it under his scalpel as lie finds a nerve or see it evaporate as does a gas, he concludes that it does not exist, because he reasons from an exclusively material point of view; but it by no means follows that he is right, and that the opinion of the rest of the world is wrong. We see, therefore, that the task of deciding as to the truth or falsity of Spiritism does not fall within the scope of physical science. When spiritist beliefs shall have become generalized, when they shall have been accepted by the masses (and, if we may judge by the rapidity with which they are being propagated, that time can hardly be very distant), it will be with those beliefs as with all new ideas that have encountered opposition; and scientific men will end by yielding to the force of evidence. They will be brought, individually, by the force of things, to admit ideas that they now reject; and, until then, it would be premature to turn them from their special studies in order to occupy them with a matter which is foreign alike to their habits of thought and to their spheres of investigation. Mean-while, those who, without a careful preparatory study of the matter, pronounce a negative verdict in regard to it, and throw ridicule upon all who are not of their way of thinking, forget that such has been done in regard to nearly all the great discoveries that honour the human race. They risk seeing their names added to the list of illustrious proscribers of new ideas, and classed with those of the members of the learned assembly which, in 1752, received Franklin's paper on lightning-rods with peals of laughter, and voted it to be unworthy of mention among the communications addressed to it; or with that other one which caused France to miss the advantage of taking the lead in the application of steam to shipping, by declaring Fulton's plans to be impracticable: and yet these subjects lay within their competence. If those two assemblies, which numbered the most eminent scientists of the world among their members, had only contempt and sarcasm for ideas which they did not understand, but which were destined to revolutionise, a few years later, science, industry, and daily life, how can we hope that a question foreign to their labours should meet with any greater degree of favour at their hands?

            The erroneous judgments of learned men in regard to certain discoveries, though regrettable for the honour of their memory, do not invalidate the title to our esteem acquired by them in regard to other matters. But is common-sense only to be found associated with an official diploma, and are there only fools and simpletons outside the walls of scientific institutions? Let our opponents condescend to glance over the ranks of the partisans of Spiritism, and see whether they contain only persons of inferior understanding, or whether, on the contrary, considering the immense number of men of worth by whom it has been embraced, it can be regarded as belonging to the category of old wives fables; whether, in fact, the character and scientific knowledge of its adherents do not rather deserve that it should be said -"When such men affirm a matter, there must at least be something in it?"

            We repeat that, if the facts we are about to consider had been limited to the mechanical movement of inert bodies, physical science would have been competent to seek out the physical cause of the phenomena; but the manifestations in question being professedly beyond the action of laws or forces yet known to men, they are necessarily beyond the competence of human science. When the facts to be observed are novel, and do not fall within the scope of any known science, the scientist, in order to study them, should throw his science temporarily aside, remembering that a new study cannot be fruitfully prosecuted under the influence of preconceived ideas.

            He who believes his reason to be infallible is very near to error. Even those whose ideas are of the falsest profess to base them on reason; and it is in the name of reason that they reject whatever seems to them to be impossible. They who formerly rejected the admirable discoveries that are the glory of the human mind did so in the name of reason; for what men call reason is often only pride disguised, and whoever regards himself as in-fallible virtually claims to be God's equal. We therefore address ourselves to those who are reasonable enough to suspend their judgment in regard to what they have not yet seen, and who, judging of the future by the past, do not believe that man has reached his apogee, or that nature has turned over for him the last leaf of her hook.